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We study how the employment effects of enterprise zones vary with their location, implementation,
and administration, based on evidence from California. We use new establishment-level data and geographic
mapping methods, coupled with a survey of enterprise zone administrators. Overall, the evidence indicates
that enterprise zones do not increase employment. However, the evidence also suggests that the enterprise
zone program has a more favorable effect on employment in zones that have a lower share of manufacturing
and in zones where managers report doing more marketing and outreach activities. On the other hand,
devoting more effort to helping firms get hiring tax credits reduces or eliminates any positive employment
effects, which may be attributable to idiosyncrasies of California’s enterprise zone program during
the period we study.
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For over 20 years, national and state policymakers have targeted economic development efforts 
toward businesses in specific geographic areas. Often called “enterprise zones,” these programs have 
developed in the context of a long-standing debate on how best to combat poverty, unemployment, and 
other social ills, which tend to be geographically concentrated. “Place-based” policies, like urban 
redevelopment, target benefits at specific economically distressed neighborhoods or other geographic areas; 
“people-based” policies, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, offer benefits to individuals based on 
individual criteria regardless of their location.1 
Enterprise zone programs are often a hybrid of place-based and people-based: targeting benefits to 
businesses located in a specified area is place-based, but many programs – including the California program 
we study in this paper – condition benefits on whether firms hire disadvantaged workers, which is people-
based. Ladd (1994) refers to “using place-specific assistance to help the residents” as a “place-based people 
strategy.” Her review of enterprise zones and similar programs stresses their diversity: looking across 
programs at the federal level and in several states, some programs are more “pure place-based” while others 
are more hybrid. Accordingly, programs can vary in their effectiveness, and in a recent study of state and 
federal programs using a consistent methodology, Ham et al. (2009) find that some states’ programs reduce 
poverty or unemployment, and one (Ohio’s) raises employment, while other states’ programs do not have 
these effects. Enterprise zone programs vary in the level and nature of tax credits and other incentives, as 
well as in other forms of assistance available to zone businesses – some of which are difficult to quantify 
and evaluate. This heterogeneity across programs limits how much one can generalize from the study of a 
single program to enterprise zones as a category or, even more broadly, to place-based policies. 
Likely reflecting this heterogeneity, the extensive research literature on the average employment 
effects of enterprise zones – where, by “average,” we mean across individual enterprise zones within a 
                                                      
1 For arguments for and against place-based policies, see Glaeser (2005, 2007) and Crane and Manville (2008).  
2 
 
particular state or federal enterprise zone program – is not unanimous in the conclusions it reaches. 2 In 
general, though, the existing evidence does not find positive employment effects of enterprise zones. For 
example, although Lynch and Zax (2008) discuss a few studies that find positive employment effects 
(Papke, 1994; O’Keefe, 2004; Busso and Kline, 2007; and a limited amount of evidence in Billings, 2009), 
they describe these findings as “anomalous” (p. 5) relative to a much larger number of studies finding no 
employment effect.3  
From a policy perspective, the absence of effects of enterprise zones, on average, is discouraging – at 
least for those who hope that geographically-targeted incentives such as enterprise zones can deliver 
benefits to economically-distressed areas. On the other hand, it is well-established that average treatment 
effects can mask important heterogeneity. If there is, in fact, variation in the effectiveness of enterprise 
zones, then there may be scope making enterprise zones more effective by replicating or encouraging the 
features of enterprise zone programs that are associated with increases in employment.  
The goal of this paper is to provide an assessment of empirical evidence on sources of variation in the 
effectiveness of enterprise zones within California’s enterprise zone program. Specifically, we explore the 
associations between the job-creating effects of enterprise zones and (1) factors relating to the areas in 
which enterprise zones are established and (2) how enterprise zones are implemented – i.e., the activities 
that zone administrators engage in to try to achieve the program’s goals. We do this in the context of an 
empirical approach, based on new data sources and methods that we have developed, which is intended to 
provide rigorous evidence on the causal effects of enterprise zone programs, although meeting this standard 
is more difficult with respect to trying to explain what makes enterprise zones more (or less) effective. 
                                                      
2 An earlier review is provided in Wilder and Rubin (1996). For a more recent reviews, see Elvery (2009), Landers 
(2006), and Lynch and Zax (2008). The literature is best viewed as estimating the average treatment effect on the 
treated (i.e., areas treated by designation as enterprise zones).  
3 An earlier review by Wilder and Rubin (1996) is somewhat more positive in concluding that enterprise zones 
increased economic activity. However, much of the evidence in this earlier review is hardly definitive when it comes 
to establishing causal effects of enterprise zones – being based, for example, on perceptions of program participants 
(e.g., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1986). See related criticisms in Boarnet (2001). In recent 
work (Neumark and Kolko, 2008), we re-examined evidence on the employment effects of enterprise zones, 
attempting to address many limitations of the existing research; our findings echo the conclusion that enterprise zones 
do not boost employment.  
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Our empirical analysis builds on previous research in which we estimate the average employment 
effect of California’s enterprise zone program. Our approach to estimating this average effect used two data 
sources: detailed GIS maps we constructed of the precise boundaries of enterprise zones and their evolution 
over time; and the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database, which includes employment and 
location information on nearly all business establishments in California in the period 1992-2004.  
The new dimension that we explore in this paper, however, is explaining variation in the 
employment effects of enterprise zones within California’s program. To do this, we conducted interviews 
with local administrators of the enterprise zone program. In these interviews, we asked about the goals of 
the program, the activities of local zone administrators, the main challenges they face, and other questions. 
We use the responses to this survey, coupled with information from the NETS and other secondary data 
sources, to characterize differences across enterprise zones along numerous dimensions. We then estimate 
models of the effects of enterprise zones that allow the employment effects of zones to vary with these zone 
characteristics. These estimates allow us to assess how local zone activities as well as features of the areas 
in which zones are established influence the effect of the enterprise zone program on jobs. In light of the 
fairly overwhelming evidence that enterprise zones are ineffective, on average, it is important to assess 
whether there is evidence that some combinations of locational factors and variations in implementation or 
administration might increase (or perhaps decrease) the effectiveness of enterprise zones.  
Focusing on within-program variation across enterprise zones means that, in effect, we hold constant 
the tax credits and other incentives that are uniform across California’s enterprise zones and assess how 
local conditions and local program administration matter. Ladd’s (1994) review suggests that “supply-side 
tax reductions” – which, in California’s case, are uniform across individual zones – are ineffective, whereas 
“interventionist components” like technical assistance – which, in California’s case, vary among zones – 
account for whatever success enterprise zone programs have (p. 202). Our approach of looking at within-




To preview the results, we do find evidence of variation in program effectiveness among individual 
zones. Zones vary in their demographic and economic conditions. They also vary because local zone 
management is responsible for marketing and outreach, coordinating other incentives, and other economic 
development activities in the zones, and zone administrators make different choices about which of these 
activities they engage in and choose to emphasize. The evidence suggests that the enterprise zone program 
has a more favorable effect on employment in zones that have a lower share of manufacturing and in zones 
where managers report doing more marketing and outreach activities; as it turns out, this latter result has 
some parallels to findings from earlier literature on heterogeneity in the effects of enterprise zones 
(discussed below). On the other hand, somewhat surprisingly, a strong focus on helping firms pursue hiring 
credits made available by the enterprise zone program appears to run counter to job-creation efforts. These 
findings have potentially important policy implications for the targeting of areas to designate as enterprise 
zones, and for features of enterprise zone programs that policymakers and administrators encourage via 
both legislation and the selection of sites as enterprise zones. Moreover, the results suggest that the overall 
findings of the literature on enterprise zones may be too pessimistic, and that it may be possible to find 
ways to make enterprise zones more effective at creating jobs.  
2. Relation to Previous Research 
Although the recent research literature on enterprise zones has focused on average effects, earlier 
work provided suggestive evidence that that there may be substantial heterogeneity in the effects of 
enterprise zones, both within and across state enterprise zone programs (e.g., Dowell, 1996; Elling and 
Sheldon, 1991; Erickson and Friedman, 1990). The earlier evidence on heterogeneity in the effects of 
enterprise zones is reviewed in Landers (2006) and Wilder and Rubin (1996). Those reviews conclude that 
there is substantial variation in the effects, and, among other conclusions, that enterprise zones were more 
effective when tax incentives were “complemented by more traditional supports for economic development 
(e.g., technical assistance, location/site analysis, special staffing)” (Wilder and Rubin, p. 478); similarly 
Elling and Sheldon conclude that administrative resources devoted to operating the enterprise zone, and 
services such as technical assistance, are associated with greater economic impact.   
5 
 
We are not sold on the empirical validity of this earlier research on heterogeneity in the effects of 
enterprise zones. First, this research is not based on comparisons with control groups, but instead only 
focuses on differences in outcomes across zones; without establishing that these differences exist relative to 
comparable control groups, however, there is no way to be sure that we are observing variation in the 
effectiveness of enterprise zones. Second, this research is not based on objective measures of outcomes. In 
the Elling and Sheldon analysis, the dependent variable on which they focus is responses of enterprise zone 
officials about the number of firms qualifying for zone benefits by investing in the zone; it is not obvious to 
us how this is objectively measured. Erickson and Friedman (1990) use a similar outcome, as well as the 
number of jobs created or saved per year as reported by local zone administrators; we have no idea how 
administrators would know these numbers, which require the type of estimation of causal effects of 
enterprise zones that poses such a challenge to researchers.4 Our strategy and our estimates address these 
two weaknesses of earlier research. First, they are based on comparisons of each enterprise zone to 
appropriate control groups. And second, they are based on objective measures of outcomes – specifically, 
measured employment at business establishments inside the zone (and in control areas).  
3. California’s Enterprise Zone Program 
 
California’s enterprise zone program has multiple goals: attracting jobs and businesses and raising 
employment is a primary goal, while others include reducing poverty and unemployment and raising 
incomes in target areas.5 The program seeks to accomplish these goals by providing a variety of tax 
incentives to businesses located in designated areas to encourage the hiring of economically-disadvantaged 
workers and to spur the creation of businesses. The largest incentive is state tax credits for hiring a 
“disadvantaged” employee. The state calculates the allowable hiring credit as a share of wages up to 150% 
of the minimum wage; the allowable credit is 50% of qualified wages in the first year, falling by 10 
                                                      
4 The Elling and Sheldon analysis also suffers from other problems. The regression models estimating the effects of 
zone characteristics on outcomes do not account for many characteristics of zones – such as their size. 
5 See Assembly Jobs, Economic Development, and the Economy Committee (2006, p. 5). These multiple goals – job 
creation and improving residents’ circumstances – stem from the 1996 merger of two precursor programs that gave 
rise to the current enterprise zone program: the Enterprise Zone Act, which provided incentives to businesses located 
in specific areas (and which led to the creation of the original enterprise zones); and the Employment and Economic 
Incentive Act, which provided incentives to businesses that hired employees living in distressed residential areas.  
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percentage points each year until reaching zero after five years. Workers qualify as “disadvantaged” if they 
are unemployed for a sufficient duration or for certain other reasons − for example, if they have sufficiently 
low income, if they belong to one of several “eligibility groups” (veteran, enrolled in welfare-to-work, etc.). 
Most importantly, workers qualify if they live in a targeted employment area (TEA) – a Census tract with 
low median income.6 A worker living in a TEA qualifies for the hiring credit regardless of the worker’s 
characteristics, and many TEA residents – particularly in mixed-income neighborhoods – are not 
“disadvantaged.” However, given that disadvantaged workers are likely to earn low wages, the tax credit 
can result in a substantial reduction in the cost of hiring low-skill labor. For example, at an $8 minimum 
wage (the current minimum in California), the credit would reduce the cost of a full-time worker earning 
$12 per hour by $12,000 in the first year, $9,600 in the second year, etc.  
The program offers four other incentives: (1) an income tax credit for sales or use taxes for 
machinery or parts for use within the zone; (2) a longer period (15 years versus 10 years) in which 
businesses can carry forward net operating losses into future years to reduce tax liabilities; (3) accelerated 
depreciation of depreciable property; and (4) a tax credit of 5% of qualified wages that low-income 
employees can claim, up to a maximum and subject to restrictions on work for the business in the zone and 
services performed within the zone. Each of these incentives is intended to reduce the tax burden or costs 
for businesses located in enterprise zones, which might be expected to spur the creation of new businesses 
or the expansion of existing ones. In addition, businesses in enterprise zones can sometimes receive 
preferential treatment on state contracts. Finally, financial lenders may deduct from their income net interest 
received from loans made to businesses in enterprise zones.7  In aggregate, these other incentives are small 
relative to the hiring credit. In 2005, the hiring credit accounted for roughly two-thirds of the program’s 
                                                      
6 It is estimated that between 80 and 90 percent of hiring credit vouchers use the TEA designation to qualify 
employees (Assembly Committee on Jobs, Economic Development and the Economy, 2009). TEA’s are defined by 
census tracts. TEA’s often include parts of an enterprise zone itself along with other lower-income neighborhoods, but 
they are defined independently of enterprise zones and do not necessarily overlap with them. Residents of TEA’s 
became eligible for the hiring tax credit beginning in 1997. Although this enlarged the pool of eligible workers, our 
analysis of the average effect of enterprise zones found no evidence that the effects of enterprise zones on job creation 
became any stronger after this policy change.   
7 See Engberg and Greenbaum (1999) for a description of subsidies in other states.   
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$421 million cost; the sales and use tax credit accounted for another quarter.8 The relative importance of the 
hiring credit illustrates the program’s goal of job creation and the appropriateness of employment growth as 
a measure of program success. 
Localities apply to the Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) to have a 
geographic area designated as an enterprise zone. Eligibility criteria include job-generating capacity as well 
as the level of economic distress measured along a number of dimensions. New zones are selected by HCD 
from the eligible areas based on these and other factors, including the local applicant’s plan for bundling 
other local incentives, administering the program, and evaluating the outcome. In the 2006 application 
round, for instance, an area was eligible for consideration as an enterprise zone if it included a residential 
portion sufficiently “distressed” (as measured by income level, income growth, unemployment, and 
poverty) or petitioned for “distressed” status based on plant closures, gang violence, or other measures. The 
area also had to include an industrial or commercial area “contiguous or adjacent to” the distressed area. In 
addition, the application for enterprise zone status required the preparation of an economic development 
plan (including marketing, finance and administration of the plan, other local incentives, infrastructure 
development plans, and information management). The new application process weighted localities’ 
economic development strategies more heavily than in the past and required localities to identify 
development objectives.9 This discussion, and in particular the recent emphasis on local strategies, 
highlights the fact that economic development administrators and policymakers may have a good deal of 
scope for decisions affecting the locations of enterprise zones and how they are implemented and 
administered – emphasizing why it is important to better understand the potential for these decisions to 
influence the effectiveness of enterprise zones. 
                                                      
8 See California Franchise Tax Board (2008). Additional information based on personal conversation with Allen 
Prohofsky, Franchise Tax Board, June 3, 2009. 
9 In the 2006 round of zone designation, applicants were scored and ranked on their economic development plan; the 
bulk of the score was derived from HCD’s assessments of the marketing strategy, plans for financing and 
administering the program, local incentives, infrastructure development plans, and information management. About 
one-quarter of the score was based on current conditions of the zone; this included the number of businesses, 
commercial and industrial vacancy rates, and available land as well as unemployment and income levels. HCD 
assigned an aggregate score as well as scores for individual components, all of which are publicly available. The 
application process is described in Department of Housing and Community Development (2006).  
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California’s enterprise zone program is what Ladd (1994) calls a “place-based people strategy.” 
Because the primary incentive – the hiring credit – is available to firms in distressed areas that hire 
disadvantaged workers, the program does attempt to target both people and places. As described above, not 
all workers that qualify for the hiring credit are “disadvantaged” since some middle- or upper-income 
workers live in TEA’s. Furthermore, TEA’s are not synonymous with enterprise zones, so the program is 
intended to help disadvantaged workers who might live outside the distressed area. Still “place-based 
people strategy” best characterizes the program. The program is also a mix of (Ladd’s words again) “supply 
size tax reductions” and “more active governmental strategy.” The recent 2006 reform, as described above, 
gave more responsibility for formulating economic development strategy and setting objectives to the local 
administrators, shifting the program’s emphasis somewhat more toward the latter approach.10 
As of the period covered by this paper, the enterprise zone program allowed for up to 42 zones in the 
state. Ten enterprise zones were created at the program’s inception in 1986; since then, legislation has 
increased the number to 42. Zones are designated for an initial 15-year term, after which 5-year extensions 
can be granted. After the 15- or 20-year period, the enterprise zone expires, and a new application must be 
submitted. In practice, there is very little turnover in enterprise zones. All of the zones designated before 
1990 were granted 5-year extensions when they reached the end of their original 15-year terms. Zones have 
expanded periodically, and in 1998 many enterprise zones were allowed a one-time expansion of their 
boundaries by up to 20% (which they could undertake later). In our survey of local enterprise zone 
administrators, we asked why zones expanded when and where they did. Two main reasons emerged. First, 
zones often expanded to benefit businesses that were moving to or growing in areas just outside the 
enterprise zone. Second, zones sometimes expanded to incorporate areas newly designated as commercial 
or industrial by the local planning process.11  
Table 1 lists the enterprise zones in the state, the years when they were initially designated, and the 
                                                      
10 This 2006 reform took place after the period of our study, 1992-2004. We cannot evaluate how this reform changed 
the program’s effectiveness. 
11 To the extent that zones expanded where businesses planned to relocate or grow, zone expansions were sometimes 
the effect rather than the cause of employment growth; thus, our estimates of the average effect of the enterprise zone 
program on employment would be biased upward, strengthening our findings in earlier research of no positive 
employment effects of enterprise zones.  
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number of expansions (if any). The table also shows a handful of enterprise zones – mainly smaller ones – 
for which the information we needed to construct the maps for our analysis (discussed below) was either 
unavailable or inconsistent. Table 2 presents descriptive information on the enterprise zones we study. 
Column (1) reports employment in each enterprise zone in our sample as of 2004. The zones are sorted 
from highest to lowest employment levels. Columns (2)-(4) provide information on enterprise zone 
employment relative to county and statewide employment. The shares of enterprise zones in county 
employment vary a good deal across counties, varying from a high of 52.8% in Shasta Metro to a low of 
0.7% in Altadena/Pasadena. Column (4) indicates that the large zones (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Santa 
Ana, and Oakland) each account, on their own, for 1% or more of total statewide employment.12  
The 42 zones in California’s enterprise zone program include a wide variety of places and local 
economies. The zones range from dense urban centers to rural areas. Some are located in rich counties, 
while others are in counties that are among the state’s poorest. And the industry composition of zones 
differs. Columns (5)-(7) of Table 2 present descriptive statistics for a range of economic factors.13 As 
already noted, zones vary in size from employment under 1,000 (Merced) to over 200,000 (San Francisco 
and Los Angeles). These larger zones do not necessarily cover more land area, so the density of 
employment per square mile varies considerably. Zones covering downtown areas, like in San Francisco 
and Santa Ana, show densities of around 20,000 workers per square mile; at the other extreme, the 
Coachella Valley, Merced, Shafter, and Yuba/Sutter zones all have employment density of fewer than 1,000 
workers per square mile. 
The composition of employment varies, too. Manufacturing accounts for more than one-third of 
employment in the Madera, Porterville, and San Diego Ysidro/Otay Mesa zones but less than 10% of 
                                                      
12 Overall employment statewide in the enterprise zones for which we have data is about 1.38 million, while overall 
employment in the counties in which the zones we study are located is 12.6 million, so that enterprise zone 
employment is about 11% of the total. Statewide employment in 2004, based on the NETS data, was 16.4 million, and 
employment in all counties with enterprise zones was about 14.2 million. Thus, if we assume that the share of county 
employment represented by enterprise zones is the same in the counties for which we do not have zone maps as for the 
counties for which we could construct these maps, then our enterprise zones represent 89% (12.6/14.2) of enterprise 
zone employment in the state.  
13 These descriptive statistics are based on 1992 employment for the areas that are or will become part of an enterprise 
zone by 2004. Data come from the NETS. Ideally we would describe zone characteristics prior to zone designation, to 
characterize enterprise zones before they were affected by the policy. The best we can do on this score is to use 1992 
data, the earliest year available in the NETS data we use.   
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employment in several zones. Nearly 90% of employees work in establishments with fewer than 50 
employees in the Merced zone, though fewer than half of employees work in small establishments in many 
zones, especially larger zones.  
Finally, the demographics of the labor markets that enterprise zones draw from may vary. We are 
unable to measure the demographic characteristics of the residents of zones, since the NETS does not 
include such data. But this may not be much of a limitation, because there is no reason to believe that 
enterprise zone employees are enterprise zone residents. Indeed, as we noted earlier, this is typically not the 
case, as the rationale for enterprise zones is their proximity to other areas of socioeconomic disadvantage; 
and employees can come from different areas as well. Looking at the education level of counties containing 
enterprise zones in column (8), the share of adults with college degrees in 1990 ranges from 35% in San 
Francisco county and 33% in Santa Clara county, where the San Jose zone is located, to 11.8% in Tulare, 
where the Lindsay and Porterville zones are located.14 
4. Estimating the Effects of Enterprise Zones in California 
 
We focus on the effects of enterprise zones on job growth. Job creation is an explicit goal of the 
program, and is also presumably a prerequisite for improving the economic circumstances of residents in 
targeted areas. In addition, in our survey of local zone administrators, nearly all respondents cited job or 
business creation when asked an open-ended question about the purpose of the enterprise zone program; far 
fewer cited improving residents’ outcomes such as unemployment or poverty. In particular, we study 
changes in employment at businesses located in enterprise zones, relative to businesses located in 
appropriate control or comparison areas. Given the structure of the state’s enterprise zone program, this is 
the correct metric for asking whether the state’s enterprise program boosted employment. Businesses in an 
enterprise zone can claim hiring credits for employees living in TEA’s (beginning in 1997), or meeting 
other eligibility criteria. In contrast, residence in the enterprise zone itself – which need not include the 
TEA – does not qualify a worker for the hiring credit. Hence, evaluating the program in terms of 
employment of zone residents would be inappropriate.  
                                                      
14 Demographic data for counties come from the 1990 U.S. Census.  
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Our approach addresses significant limitations of prior research estimating the effects of enterprise 
zones. First, a central challenge in estimating the effects of enterprise zones is to identify geographic areas 
that precisely reflect enterprise zone boundaries for which outcomes of interest – such as employment – can 
be measured. In California and many other places, the boundaries of enterprise zones do not follow census 
tracts, zip codes, or other standard geographic designations. Instead, studies have used aggregate data on zip 
codes (e.g., Dowall, 1996; Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2007) or census tracts (e.g., O’Keefe, 2004) to 
approximate these boundaries. These methods, however, introduce measurement error by incorrectly 
assigning areas (and the workers or businesses in them) as inside or outside enterprise zones (Papke, 
1993).15 In order to precisely identify zone boundaries, we digitally map California’s enterprise zones 
street-by-street rather than approximating with census tracts, zip codes, etc. Of course the precise 
geographic contours of enterprise zones that we create are only useful if we can map business 
establishments or employment into them. The NETS data are uniquely suited to this task, as they include 
exact street addresses that we have geocoded to precise geographic locations.    
The second challenge concerns the selection of appropriate control groups, which ideally consist of 
areas economically similar to enterprise zones but lacking enterprise zone designation. Some studies have 
used broad control groups – such as the rest of the state – that may preclude meaningful comparisons with 
the enterprise zones (e.g., Peters and Fisher, 2002; Lynch and Zax, 2008). Others have used propensity 
score matching based on residential and employment characteristics (Greenberg and Engberg, 2004; 
O’Keefe, 2004; Elvery, 2009). However, propensity score matching may fail to account for unobservable 
sources of differences in job growth that may be the basis for assignment to zones. Also, many of these 
studies do not take advantage of before and after observations on enterprise zone and control areas.  
We use two approaches to this problem. One is to consider a narrow buffer (or “control ring”) just 
outside the enterprise zone as a control group, as well as areas that are added to enterprise zones at different 
                                                      
15 For example, Elvery (2008) notes that for the two states he studies, if enterprise zones are defined as the areas 
encompassing all zip codes that overlap with enterprise zones, then the resulting enterprise zone definitions are six 
times larger than the actual zones. Similarly, he shows that, based on 1990 Census data and tracts, less than one-half of 
the population residing in census tracts that include enterprise zones actually live in enterprise zones.  
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times, taking advantage of the ability of California’s enterprise zones to expand numerous times.16 The 
second is to exclude the control rings, and to focus exclusively on the areas added to the enterprise zone at 
different times. In our view, this latter approach provides the most reliable estimates, because it has been 
demonstrated through the policy process that the areas in the control groups used in this approach were 
appropriate for enterprise zone designation. In addition, we estimate heavily-saturated regression models to 
account for remaining possible differences between treatment and control areas.17  
4.1. Data and Geographic Methods 
 
We use the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database and GIS software to address many 
of the difficulties and complications that arise in delineating the boundaries of areas affected by enterprise 
zone incentives, and measuring the effects of these incentives on affected businesses. The NETS is a 
national, longitudinal file of the universe of business establishments, created by Walls & Associates using 
establishment-level data from Dun & Bradstreet. Our extract of the NETS covers all of California over the 
period 1992-2004. The NETS provides exact street addresses for establishments in every year, allowing us 
to identify location precisely rather than having to aggregate to the tract or zip code level, once the 
enterprise zones are mapped.18 
Preparing the data for analysis involved two processes: digitizing enterprise zone maps, and 
geocoding establishments in the NETS so that they can be mapped.19 The geocoding is fairly standard. The 
mapping is more complex, however. Mapping establishments to enterprise zones requires GIS maps 
(“shapefiles”) of the zones, and our identification strategy also requires historical maps to distinguish 
original zone definitions from expansion areas. As these shapefiles are not available, we had to create 
historical and current enterprise zone maps from official lists of street address ranges and the years they 
                                                      
16 The use of a narrow control ring has some parallels to the regression discontinuity design that Billings (2009) uses 
to study Colorado enterprise zones.  The use of areas added at different times has parallels with some of the analyses 
of federal zones in Busso and Kline (2007). 
17 Our earlier study (Neumark and Kolko, 2008) also looked at the problem of other geographically-targeted policies 
that covered areas overlapping with enterprise zones. The results were not sensitive to accounting for these other 
policies, so we do not emphasize them here.  
18 Neumark et al. (2007) conducted a detailed investigation of the quality of the NETS data along numerous 
dimensions.  
19 See Neumark and Kolko (2008) for a more-detailed discussion of the mapping and geocoding – a labor-intensive 
process that occupied numerous research assistants over a two-year period.  
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were included in the zone; these lists are provided by local zone administrators to HCD.20 Because the date 
each address range was added to the zone is contained in the underlying data for each hypothetical address, 
we can select street ranges for the year in which the street range would have entered the zone.  
After creating the GIS shapefile with all zone streets, we display the zone streets and the geocoded 
businesses in the same map and then select businesses based on their location, by year, in the enterprise 
zone treatment or control areas. Geocoded longitude and latitude that are assigned to establishments 
correspond to the center of the street on which they are located, so some modifications had to be 
implemented for the correct classification of whether a business was inside an enterprise zone for streets on 
the boundaries of zones, by determining on which side of a street a business was located. 
Overall, our approach to determining whether businesses are in or out of a zone in each year was 
successful. We checked the error rate by comparing the final variable created for the enterprise data 
indicating zone status in various years against the original zone ranges from the street address lists for San 
Diego (a city zone) and Yuba Sutter (a rural zone), for random samples of observations, finding both to 
have error rates of less than 1%. However, our approach was more problematic for the zones in Los 
Angeles, for which the mapping of enterprise zones was much more complicated because of the large 
numbers of street ranges and the five separate zones in the city. Because of these complications and 
problems with the coding of the street ranges, we treat the separate zones in Los Angeles as one zone. For 
this zone we end up with a classification error rate in the 5-6% range – higher than for other enterprise 
zones because of the unavoidable complexity of the Los Angeles area.  
The enterprise zone maps are also used to create the control rings discussed above. In particular, 
based on the GIS maps of enterprise zones as of the last year of the sample, we define these control rings as 
areas of a fixed, relatively small distance from the outer boundary of an enterprise zone – 1,000 feet – on 
the presumption that economic conditions in these narrow rings, aside from the effects of the enterprise 
                                                      
20 Available at http://www.hcd.ca.gov/fa/cdbg/ez/enterprise/ (viewed November 1, 2006). These lists are used by 
California’s Franchise Tax Board to determine whether establishments qualify for benefits. In some cases date ranges 
were missing or ambiguous in the files listed on the HCD webpage, in which case we contacted zone administrators 




zone, are likely to be very similar in the treated area that became an enterprise zone and the surrounding, 
nearby control area. 
4.2. Statistical Approach  
 
Our statistical analysis is based on observations on what we call “subzones.” For any enterprise zone, 
there is a set of subzones consisting of the original zone plus each expansion. An observation, then, is a 
subzone-year pair. When we include control rings, we generate an additional observation for each year’s 
data on each control ring; we also refer to the control ring as a subzone. To illustrate, Figures 1A and 1B 
show maps for the Santa Ana enterprise zone. Figure 1A displays the city streets including and surrounding 
the zone, as well as the zone streets as of 2004; Figure 1B displays the initially designated streets, the 
expansion streets, and the 1,000-foot control ring.  
We estimate models both including and excluding the control rings. When we exclude the control 
rings – generating our preferred estimates – the effects of enterprise zones are identified by comparing what 
happens when a subzone of a zone is designated to changes in subzones that were designated earlier or will 
be designated later. Thus, for example, the blue streets in Figure 1 would serve as the control group for the 
red streets in the original enterprise zone, and in later data the red streets would serve as the control group 
for the blue streets.21 
Of course as discussed above, the validity of our empirical strategy depends on the validity of the 
comparison areas; that is, they have to provide counterfactual estimates of what would have happened in the 
treatment areas had enterprise designation not occurred. Although this is inherently untestable, a look at 
some of the data on treatment and comparison areas is informative, and is given in Table 3. The table 
reports some figures for the sample as a whole (i.e., covering the enterprise zones and the control rings), as 
well as the enterprise zone separately – including the originally-designated areas as well as the expansions 
separately – and the 1,000-foot control ring. These are reported for 1992, the first year of the sample.22  
                                                      
21 That is, the expansion areas are, themselves, treatment areas in the year they were added to the enterprise zone; the 
control group when an expansion area is added consists of the initial designation area, any other expansion areas added 
at different times. 
22 Ideally, we would like pre-treatment comparisons. However, many of the areas in the original zone designations 
were so designated before 1992, and there is no pre-treatment year for the control rings.    
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As indicated in the first row, enterprise zone employment constitutes about 69% of total employment 
in the zones and the control rings, and of this, about 72% is in the areas originally designated as part of 
zones. Clearly there is plenty of employment (and also plenty of establishments, as shown in the second 
row) in the control ring and, of course, in the expansion areas. Perhaps even more informative is the third 
row, which reports employment density. Although density is higher in the areas designated as enterprise 
zones than the control rings, density is still quite high in the latter. Moreover, density is actually higher in 
the expansion areas than in the initially-designated areas. The last three rows report some information on 
establishment size and composition. Establishment size in the zones and the control rings is quite similar 
(around 14.5), although slightly higher in the enterprise zone expansion areas than in the originally-
designated areas. The same is true of the share of employees in low-wage industries.23 The share in 
manufacturing is somewhat higher in the zone expansion areas, and somewhat lower in the control rings. It 
is certainly the case that the three types of areas are not identical in terms of these measures; but it would be 
quite surprising if they were. Nonetheless, there is extensive employment in the expansion areas and the 
control rings, and the types of establishments do not appear inordinately different across them. In the 
regression analysis described in the next sub-section, we take further steps to account for differences 
between the treatment and comparison areas.  
4.3. Regression Models 
The regression models we estimate require some notation. We index the geographic locations 
corresponding to each enterprise zone indexed by j = 1, …, J, which include the zone itself and can include 
the control ring. We have observations over time, indexed by t = 1, …, T. We define subzones within j, 
indexed by k, with k = 0, …, Kj; k = 0 for the part of j that is never in a zone (the control ring), and k = 1, 
…, Kj for the parts that become a zone initially and with each expansion. The dependent variable Yjkt is log 
of the number of jobs in a subzone.24 We denote by EZjkt a dummy variable for whether subzone k in area j 
                                                      
23 We ranked industries by average pay based on 2004 data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 
dividing NAICS industry subsectors into three groups, each containing approximately one-third of the workforce.  
24 In the handful of cases where employment was zero (26 observations), we substituted one for zero before taking 
logs. This can be viewed as perhaps introducing the slightest measurement error, or presuming that the data are not 
sufficiently accurate to distinguish between zero and one job or establishment in a cell. Regardless, we verified that  
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is in an enterprise zone in year t. So for the part of area of j that is never in the zone, EZjkt = 0 for all t; in a 
subzone that becomes a zone in t’, EZjkt = 0 for all t < t’, and EZjkt = 1 for all t ≥ t’; and for the part that is 
always a zone in our sample period, EZjkt = 1 for all t. 
To estimate the effects of enterprise zones when heterogeneity in effects is ignored – the focus of our 
earlier work (Neumark and Kolko, 2008) – we estimate the models:  
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In model (1), enterprise zone designation shifts the level of employment, and in model (2) it shifts the 
growth rate. We interpret specification (2) as testing whether the lowering of costs associated with 
enterprise zone designation implies that enterprise zones get a larger share of businesses and jobs stemming 
from the steady upward growth in population and output. Alternatively, there may be a relatively rapid 
increase in either jobs or establishments, after which rents adjust to offset the cost advantages, so that there 
is more of a one-time shift in the dependent variable; this is captured in specification (1).26  
The variables Djk, Dt, and Dj are fixed effects for each subzone, year, and enterprise zone, 
respectively. These are added to the models in a highly flexible way so as to control for differences between 
each of the subzones in a zone (as well as the control ring), and differences in the economic shocks that 
affect each zone (treated as common across the subzones of a zone). In particular, the dummy variables Djk 
capture fixed differences across subzones. These control for any differences in characteristics of each 
subzone and control ring, such as education levels, industry mix, infrastructure, size, etc., that are time-
invariant. By construction, of course, these also control for any overall time-invariant differences between 
                                                                                                                                                                              
simply dropping these cases had no impact on the estimates.   
25 The sum over k’ begins with zero if the control ring is included, and one if it is not. 
26 Because the data begin in 1992, whereas most zones were originally designated prior to that year, much of our 
identifying information comes from expansions. Thus, interpreting our results as estimating “the” effects of enterprise 
zones hinges on the assumption that the effects of original designations and expansions are the same. We have 
estimated versions of equations (1) and (2) that separately identify the effects of initial zone designations and 
expansions, and find no evidence of differences. We also estimated model with long lags, for which the effects of 
initial designations are identified, and found no differences relative to models without lags.     
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areas initially designated as zones, zone expansion areas, and control rings. The Dt capture aggregate 
changes, to account for the possibility that enterprise zones tended to be established in periods of either 
particularly high or low employment growth across all of the regions included in our sample, owing to 
factors such as the business cycle. Finally, the term Dj·Dt allows for enterprise zone-specific changes over 
time in employment, to allow for differences in growth rates over time across the broad area covered by a 
zone, its expansions, and the associated control ring (when included).27 
To assess how enterprise zone program effects vary across zones – the focus of this paper – we 
augment the regression models with measures of local zone conditions and activities. Denoting by Cjk a 
vector of enterprise zone characteristics,28 our models become: 
(3) 
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The estimates of the vector of coefficients γ capture variation in the effects of enterprise zones – on 
the level of employment specification (3), and on the rate of job growth in specification (4) – associated 
with variation in enterprise zone characteristics.29 Note that for specification (3), the main effects of the 
zone characteristics are subsumed in the subzone-specific dummy variables Djk, given that the variables in 
C have only cross-sectional variation. For specification (4), the main effects would be interactions of C and 
the time trend t, which are subsumed in the enterprise zone-specific year effects Dj·Dt.30 
                                                      
27 We can allow arbitrary changes over time for each enterprise zone j and still identify β, because we identify effects 
off of subzone-level variation. 
28 Note that our measures of variation in zone conditions and activities come from a survey conducted at a point in 
time, so there is no time variation in these characteristics (and hence no t subscript on C). 
29 Note that for each characteristic C, the interacted variable has the weighted mean subtracted off, so the estimated 
coefficient of the enterprise zone dummy measures the effect at the weighted sample means of the variables in C. 
30 There is a potentially subtle complication if we think of the zone characteristics from our survey as not applying to 
the control rings. In this case, it is still true that for the specifications excluding the control rings, and for all of the 
specifications focusing only on the zone characteristics based on the NETS or other data sources (employment density,  
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In all of the estimations, to allow for arbitrary correlations over time within areas and across 
observations on the subzones of each zone, we use standard errors that cluster on the enterprise zone only; 
this also allows for different error variances across zones.31 Estimates are always weighted by 1992 
employment in the subzone.  
A potentially important limitation of this analysis is that we do not have as rigorous an approach for 
estimating effects of program characteristics as we do for estimating the average effects of enterprise 
programs. In particular, as explained in the next section, the information from zone administrators comes 
from a single point in time, following the end of the sample period. As a consequence, this information will 
not capture changes over time that may have occurred in zone activities. In addition, it is possible that the 
reported activities reflect responses to past economic developments in the zone. Thus, the inferences we 
draw from this analysis have to be viewed more cautiously than those regarding the average effects of 
enterprise zones. Nonetheless, absent the availability of data on enterprise zone activities over time – and 
we are not aware of any such data, although they could in principle be collected – this is the best we can do. 
4.4. Results on Average Effects 
Before turning in detail to our analysis of variation in the effectiveness of enterprise zones in 
California, we provide a brief summary of our earlier findings on their average effects. Representative 
estimates of specifications (1) and (2) are reported in Table 4. The control rings are included in column (1) 
but excluded in column (2). In Panel A, which corresponds to specification (1) above, the key independent 
variable is the dummy variable for enterprise zones, so that enterprise zone designation shifts the level of 
employment. The estimated coefficient of this variable is negative, rather than positive, suggesting that, if 
anything, enterprise zones decrease employment slightly (by about 1.5 percent); but in both columns the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
industry mix, etc.) – which apply to the control rings as well – the zone-specific year effects Dj·Dt subsume the main 
effects.  
31 Because we do not have data on a large number of zones, the usual asymptotics under which these standard errors 
are consistent, and confidence intervals therefore provide the correct coverage, may not apply. Cameron et al. (2008) 
have shown that using the wild bootstrap, modified to account for clustering, provides confidence intervals for the t-
statistics based on the standard cluster-robust standard errors with coverage probabilities that are approximately 
correct even when the number of groups (zones, in our case) is quite small. In their Monte Carlo simulations, when the 
number of groups is in the 20’s, confidence intervals based on the standard cluster-robust standard errors are fairly 
accurate; but this result need not carry over to our particular specification. In addition to the standard cluster-robust 
standard errors, therefore, we have also calculated these bootstrapped confidence intervals. As reported in our earlier 
paper, for the employment regressions for the average effects the statistical conclusions were nearly always the same.    
19 
 
estimated effect is statistically insignificant. Panel B, instead, models the effect of enterprise zones as 
shifting the growth rate of jobs. The estimates provide no evidence that enterprise zones boost the rate of 
job growth. The estimates are small and statistically insignificant, and in the preferred specification in 
column (2) the estimate is negative rather than positive.  
We have subjected these specifications to an extensive battery of sensitivity analyses, and the finding 
of no employment effect is very robust (Neumark and Kolko, 2008).32 Among the sensitivity analyses were: 
accounting for the effects of other geographically-targeted policies; specifying the models to include large 
numbers of leads and lags of the enterprise zone variable; using 2,500-foot instead of 1,000-foot control 
rings; including in the zone streets that were difficult to classify and hence left out of the main analysis; 
excluding streets within a 100-foot buffer on either side of the enterprise zone boundary, to reduce 
classification errors; not weighting the estimates; including separate linear time trends for each subzone; 
dropping Los Angeles, which has a strong influence on the estimates by virtue of its size;33 allowing 
differential effects of enterprise zones beginning in 1997, when residents of TEA’s – a potentially larger 
pool – became eligible for the hiring credit; and estimating separate effects for the areas included in initial 
enterprise zone designations and areas brought in via expansions.  
5. Evidence on Variation in the Effectiveness of Enterprise Zones 
 
Although the tax and other incentives offered by the state are uniform across enterprise zones, local 
zone administrators oversee marketing strategies for making businesses aware of the tax benefits and for 
coordinating complementary local incentives.34 To characterize the variation in local economic 
development strategies and local resources devoted to the program, we conducted a survey in 2007 of 
enterprise zone administrators. The effects of enterprise zones could also vary owing to their employment 
density, their industry mix, local demographics, and so on. Credits on sales tax for machinery purchases, for 
                                                      
32 In that paper, we also discuss possible reasons why enterprise zones may fail to create jobs.  
33 For the specifications including the control rings (only), we find a significant positive effect of enterprise zones on 
employment when we exclude Los Angeles. This is the only case where this occurs in all of our sensitivity analyses. 
34 The potential importance of local efforts is highlighted by a recent reform of the enterprise zone program, which 
puts more emphasis on local management and local commitment. In particular, California AB 1550, enacted in 2006, 
updates standards for evaluation of enterprise zone performance, among other reforms. Insufficient local commitment 
to supporting the program, defined at the time of zone designation, is potentially grounds for de-designation 
(Arambula, 2008).  
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instance, are likely to have a larger effect on manufacturing firms than on services firms, and certain areas 
may be more amenable to manufacturing development than others. The hiring credit, too, could have a 
differential effect if firms in some industries can more easily employ disadvantaged workers. In our 
analysis, therefore, we also examine a short list of characteristics of enterprise zone locations that could 
influence the effectiveness of the program at the zone level, some of which were highlighted in Table 2. 
5.1. Survey of Enterprise Zone Administrators 
Our survey of enterprise zone administrators asked open-ended qualitative questions about their 
views on the purpose of the enterprise zone program, if they evaluate the program’s effectiveness, and what 
their biggest successes and challenges have been. We also asked detailed questions about how the local 
zone tries to maximize the effectiveness of the program, and we received quantitative responses to the 
following questions:35 
On a 1-5 scale, where 1 means “not at all active” and 5 means “extremely active,” how active is your 
zone in doing each of the following? 
1.  using marketing, for instance informing businesses about the zone and what incentives it 
offers; 
2.  amending zoning or other local regulations to favor growth in your zone; 
3.  training workers to make qualified candidates or operating hiring centers to match them 
with businesses; 
4.  facilitating earning tax credits, for example by hosting informational sessions with business 
owners or employees;36 
5.  encouraging the building of additional infrastructure, such as a bus line or freeway spur; 
                                                      
35 We conducted phone interviews in the spring and summer of 2007, lasting typically 30-45 minutes. The survey was 
a mix of yes/no, 1-5 scales, and open-ended questions. We talked to 36 zone managers; since some are responsible for 
multiple zones located in the same county, these 36 interviews covered all zones listed in Table 1, including those we 
did not include in our quantitative analysis. We identified potential respondents from the list of enterprise zone 
contacts on the HCD website. We promised respondents confidentiality. 
36 We did not refer specifically to the hiring tax credit, but it is clear from the open-ended responses to the survey that 
the question was interpreted this way. A large share of respondents provided information about how they help firms 
get vouchers for hiring eligible workers, referring businesses to tax consultants, etc., and no respondents referred to 
any other kind of tax credits. Thus, in what follows we interpret this response as referring specifically to facilitating 
earning the hiring tax credit.    
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6.  offering other tax incentives, credits, or discounts on public services at the local level. 
It would have been ideal to be able to gather historical information about zone activities from the 
original dates of zone designation to the last year covered by the data, but that was not feasible. Some 
respondents have worked as zone administrators for as little as a few months, and their responses refer only 
to the very recent past and the present.37 On the other hand, many respondents had several years experience 
with their zone, some up to 20 years. Thus, the responses represent a mix of recent and long-term views and 
behaviors. Nonetheless, these surveys do provide insight into local zone activities.     
Among the six activities we asked about, local zone administrators said they were most active using 
marketing and facilitating earning hiring tax credits, which both received average scores of 4.0 on the 1-5 
scale.  The next highest scores were, in order, offering other tax incentives, credits, or discounts (2.9), 
training workers or operating hiring centers (2.8), encouraging infrastructure building (2.3), and amending 
zoning or other local regulations (1.6). Zones varied in their self-reported scores: the average score across 
all six activities ranged from 4.3 for an urban zone in southern California to 1.2 for a rural zone. In general, 
the larger and more urban zones are more likely to facilitate earning tax credits and to offer other tax 
incentives, credits, or discounts on public services, and less likely to encourage building additional 
infrastructure.38   
We noted earlier that we focus on the job-creating effects of enterprise zones both because this is an 
explicit policy goal, and it is cited by zone administrators. This latter conclusion came out of the open-
ended questions included in the interview, the responses to which indicated that zone administrators widely 
shared the view that the purpose of the enterprise zone program is to create jobs, in part by attracting and 
retaining businesses. In particular, we asked respondents what they thought the “primary goal” of the 
                                                      
37 Although the 2006 reforms to the program had mainly to do with criteria for zone selection and reporting 
requirements, they may have affected behavior of zone administrators, further emphasizing that the 2007 survey 
responses may not always give an accurate representation of what zone administrators were doing in earlier years.  
38 The correlation of facilitating tax credits is .34 (p=.10) with employment and .30 (p=.15) with zone employment 
density. The correlation of offering other tax incentives, credits, or discounts on public services is .33 (p=.12) with 
employment and is .33 (p=.11) with zone density. The correlation of encouraging building additional infrastructure is 
−.35 (p=.09) with employment and −.44 (p=.03) with density.   
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enterprise zone program was. Nearly all mentioned job growth; far fewer also explicitly mentioned 
reducing unemployment or poverty.39  
5.2. Results 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on a number of zone characteristics that we incorporate in our 
regression models. The top panel reports statistics for baseline characteristics of the zone. Most of these 
were reported by zone in Table 2. Here we report means and standard deviations as well as the 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles of the distribution across zones (all unweighted).40 The bottom panel presents information on 
the survey responses regarding zone activities. Aside from the mean differences just discussed, the fairly 
substantial variation in many of the measures is noteworthy.   
The estimates of different versions of specifications (3) and (4) are presented in Tables 6 and 7. We 
report estimates for four different models or samples, and for each of these with and without the control 
groups. First, we include only the zone-level characteristics related to employment, demographics, and year 
of designation. Second, we instead include only the information based on the survey responses. Third, we 
include both sets of interactions simultaneously. And finally, because one of the survey responses is 
unavailable for Los Angeles, we report this same full specification for the full sample including Los 
Angeles, but dropping the missing variable (“Offering other tax incentives”). 
In light of the fact that the average effect of enterprise zones is near zero, evidence of variation in the 
effects of enterprise zones could suggest that some enterprise zones increase employment, while others 
decrease it. While one might think that if an incentive is ineffective it can have, at worst, no effect, this is 
not the case in an environment in which regions compete for employers/jobs. In this case, if one region 
                                                      
39 Representative answers included the following: “To stimulate jobs and investment in economically disadvantaged 
areas of the State.” “To help the local economy by giving local businesses a means to expand and to encourage new 
firms to enter their area instead of a competing area.” “The program is a business attraction and retention tool. It’s the 
only statewide program we have.” “To make California competitive against other states and regions in terms of 
manufacturing.  Enterprise zones are the only incentive that they really have left.” 
40 While weighted estimates would give a more representative picture of the variation faced by workers, the 
unweighted estimates – in particular for the standard deviations – give a better idea of how much zones vary.   
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adopts effective methods and one adopts ineffective methods, the latter can lose out, generating fewer jobs 
than it would if there were no enterprise zones, as businesses are attracted to the first region.41 
In the employment level model (Table 6), several zone characteristics interact with the enterprise 
zone variable to yield statistically significant effects. Focusing first on the characteristics of areas where 
zones are established, the estimated coefficient of the interaction between the enterprise zone dummy 
variable and the share of zone employment in manufacturing (at the beginning of the sample period) is 
negative in all six specifications, and statistically significant at the 1-percent or 5-percent level when the 
control rings are included. There is weaker evidence of a negative interaction with zone density; this is 
significant when we include the control rings and the interactions with the survey responses are also 
included. And there is evidence that zones designated more recently have more positive employment 
effects, although this evidence is statistically significant only in the last two columns, and therefore is less 
robust than the other findings on which we focus.  
Turning to the survey responses, there is consistent evidence that local zone marketing activity 
increases the job-creating effects of enterprise zones; the estimated interaction is significant at the 1-
percent, 5-percent level, or 10-percent level with or without the control rings included, as long as the 
specifications also include the interactions with the other zone characteristics. Among other local activities, 
facilitating earning hiring tax credits appears to reduce the effect of enterprise zones on employment, 
although this estimate is significant (at the 5-percent or 10-percent level) only when the control rings are 
included. Finally, offering other tax incentives, credits, or discounts is associated with a weaker 
employment effect, significant at the 5-percent or 10-percent level in the specification without control rings.  
In Table 7, where we look at the effects of enterprise zones on employment growth, the evidence in 
generally a bit weaker, but qualitatively similar. In particular, we continue to find negative estimates of the 
interaction between the enterprise zone treatment variable and the baseline manufacturing share, although 
the estimate is statistically significant in only one case. There is, again, some weak evidence that zones 
                                                      
41 Of course the estimated coefficients of the enterprise zone indicator and its interaction with zone characteristics 
only tell us about the effects of enterprise zones relative to the counterfactual of no enterprise zones. A negative 
coefficient on an interaction between the enterprise zone indicator and a zone characteristic does not imply that in an 
enterprise zone with that characteristic employment declines in absolute terms.    
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designated in later years have more positive employment effects. Similarly, in every case we again find a 
positive interaction with marketing activities, although the estimated interaction is statistically significant in 
only one case. We continue to find some evidence that when zone administrators concentrate on facilitating 
earning hiring tax credits, employment growth is lower; these results are significant at the 5-percent or 10-
percent level, although only in the specifications including the control rings.  And finally, there is also some 
evidence of a negative interaction with offering other tax incentives.42  
Given that we have a fairly small number of enterprise zones from which we identify the effects of 
variation in zone characteristics, and given that the models in Tables 6 and 7 include many interactions with 
zone characteristics that may have a high degree of multicollinearity, we were interested in assessing how 
robust the results are, aside from what can be seen from the different specifications reported in those tables. 
We therefore re-estimated the models including only one interaction in each specification, and compared 
the results to those in Tables 6 and 7. For example, we estimated the model adding only the interaction with 
the share in manufacturing in 1992, and compared the estimated coefficient of that interaction with what we 
get when all of the interactions are included in the various specifications. We found evidence that is 
generally supportive of the conclusions we drew from Tables 6 and 7. There continues to be evidence that 
zones with a larger share of manufacturing employment at the beginning of the sample period are less 
effective at creating jobs, and the zones designated later are more effective. We continue to find some 
evidence that marketing activities boost the effectiveness of enterprise zones, but that zones that focus on 
facilitating earning the hiring tax credit are less effective at creating jobs. In contrast, the evidence 
regarding offering other tax incentives appears less robust.43 
One problem with the estimates reported thus far is that they do not easily convey the effects of 
enterprise zones with particular types of characteristics. Of course one can use the descriptive information 
in Table 5 coupled with the regression estimates to do these calculations; but that is cumbersome and would 
not be informative about statistical significance. To better convey this information, we use the regression 
                                                      
42 One other result to note is that, as reported in the first row of the table, the effects of enterprise zones at the sample 
means are significant and positive. However, this holds only for the specifications with control rings, in which we 
place less store.  
43 Tables with these results are available from the authors upon request.   
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estimates and the variance-covariance matrix to calculate the effects of enterprise zones for different values 
of the zone characteristics. Specifically, for a given characteristic, we hold the others at their weighted 
mean values, and calculate the implied effects (and standard errors) at the 25 and 75
th percentiles of the 
distribution of the characteristic in question.44 
To clarify, suppose our model contained two enterprise zone characteristics C
1 and C
2. Then 
specification (3) becomes  
(5) 
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and, for example, the estimated effect of enterprise zones at the 25
th percent of C
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The results are reported in Table 8, for the three zone characteristics for which we found relatively 
robust evidence of differential effects.46 As the table shows, for the specifications with control rings, the 
estimated effect of enterprise zones is in fact positive and statistically significant in areas with a relatively 
low manufacturing base (the 25
th percentile, or a 9.2 percent share), and the point estimates are qualitatively 
similar when the control rings are excluded. With regard to local marketing efforts, in three of the four 
cases we find a positive and statistically significant effect of enterprise zones for relatively high activity 
levels (the 75 percentile, or a 5 on the 1-5 scale on which responses are ranked). Finally, with respect to 
facilitating the earning of hiring credits, we find that the estimated effects – for the specifications including 
control rings – are positive when engagement in this activity is low (the 25
th percentile, or a 3 on the 1-5 
scale). The implied effects of moving from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile, holding other characteristics at 
their means, can be read off of the differences in effects at these two percentiles. For example, looking at 
columns (5) and (6), the effect of moving marketing activity from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile is a 1.5 
percentage point increase in the employment growth rate, and the implied effect of moving from the 25
th to 
                                                      
44 For the standard error calculations, we treat these percentiles as known.  
45 Note that we use unweighted percentiles, since our goal is to report the implied effects for different types of 
enterprise zones. 




th percentile of the share manufacturing is 0.8 percentage point slower employment growth. The 
implied effects from such calculations are quite large, but the standard errors are sizable, and of course in 
comparing across actual zones one would want to take account of differences in all characteristics.47  
5.3. Robustness Analyses 
One potential problem with estimating the effects of enterprise zones is that the program could have 
positive spillovers, encouraging employment growth not only within zone boundaries but just outside zone 
boundaries as well. In this case, when we estimate the effects of enterprise zones by comparing the zones to 
immediately neighboring areas we may have a bias towards finding no effect.48 To examine this issue, we 
have re-estimated the models using a considerably larger control ring that extends 2,500 feet from the 
boundaries of the enterprise zone. If positive spillover effects are important, then we should find larger 
effects when using the larger control ring, although of course the area in the larger control ring may be less 
comparable to the enterprise zone treatment areas. As reported in the top panel of Table 9, the estimates 
using the larger control ring are virtually the same as the corresponding estimates in Table 8.49 Thus, we 
conclude that positive spillovers likely to do not influence our results.  
A second robustness analysis we considered is intended to address possible differences between the 
treatment and comparison areas. In particular, although we have argued that the areas appear largely 
comparable, and that our regression models capture differences between the areas, these arguments referred 
to the differences in levels (or time-invariant characteristics) across areas initially designated as enterprise 
zones, expansion areas, and control rings. If enterprise zones were established or expanded into areas that 
had different trajectories – either faster or slower employment growth – then our estimates could still be 
biased. To address this in a quite flexible way, we augmented the regression models (3) and (4) to include a 
                                                      
47 Note, of course, that many of the implied effects of zone characteristics are much smaller. We have applied a filter 
of emphasizing those that are significant and hence, in general, largest. Of course similar calculations can be done by 
combining any of the regression estimates with the descriptive statistics in Table 5.  
48 Spillovers could stem from a number of sources, including increased retail “traffic,” rising incomes of nearby 
residents, and changes in infrastructure. The discussion assumes positive effects. If enterprise zone have negative 
effects, then again positive spillovers (i.e., spillovers in the same direction) would generate a bias toward finding no 
effect.   
49 We show the results for the employment level specification; results were also insensitive to using the larger control 
ring for the employment growth rate specification. Only the results using the control ring are different in this case, 
which is why columns (3) and (4) are empty.   
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full set of interactions between the year fixed effects and two dummy variables: one for all areas that are in 
control rings, and one for all zone expansions. This specification allows for arbitrary differences in the 
economic shocks affecting these two types of areas, relative to the initial designation areas of enterprise 
zones, and hence goes a long way toward accounting for time-varying differences between the three types 
of areas.50 The results are reported in the bottom panel of Table 9.  Compared to the baseline estimates in 
Table 8, columns (1)-(4), the point estimates are very similar, although less precise, unsurprisingly. Thus, 
allowing for differences in underlying employment changes in treatment and control areas does not change 
the results or the conclusions.  
5.4. Relocation 
Although some of the estimates in Table 8 point to characteristics of enterprise zone locations or 
administration that can lead to positive employment effects, any evidence of positive effects of enterprise 
zones on employment must consider the possibility that enterprise zones boost employment not through the 
creation of new jobs, and not by simply encouraging existing establishments to move into an enterprise 
zone to take advantage of zone incentives.51 In contrast to the possibility of positive spillovers considered in 
the previous sub-section, the relocation story is one of negative spillovers. The possibility that enterprise 
zones simply create incentives for businesses to move from outside to inside the zone has been noted most 
forcefully, perhaps, by Ladd (1994), who argues that the principal effect of pure place-based incentives 
(that do not also focus on residents, community resources, etc.) is to generate this type of relocation.  
The most extensive evidence on relocation in response to zone incentives comes from previous 
experience in the United Kingdom – in which, unlike the United States, zones were established in places 
with little or no industrial activity. Research on the U.K. program found that between 50 and 80 percent of 
enterprise zone businesses had relocated into the zones, prompting the British government to phase out the 
program (Papke, 1993). Earlier evidence for the United States suggested that relocation has played a much 
                                                      
50 We of course cannot allow arbitrary year effects for each subzone separately, as this would fully subsume the 
effects of enterprise zone designation.  
51 The concept of a “new job” is ambiguous. When we refer to employment growth attributable to the creation of new 
jobs, we mean increases in births of establishments or growth of existing establishments, or conversely decreases in 
establishment deaths or contractions.  
28 
 
smaller role (e.g., Erickson, et al., 1989; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1986), 
although the data have not been available to estimate the relocation response to enterprise zones and to 
compare it to other responses. Reflecting the preference for boosting births, for example, rather than 
relocations, some states have inserted provisions that bar relocating businesses from obtaining enterprise 
zone benefits (Wilder and Rubin, 1996). On the other hand, as Papke (1993) notes, relocation is not 
necessarily all bad, as it may bring economic activity to a region that previously lacked it, which may still 
generate some of the externalities or redistribution that policymakers intended. 
As it turns out, the NETS data are ideally suited to studying the question of relocation, since they 
report the exact address (which we have geocoded) of each establishment in each year. Our strategy is to 
identify types of establishment moves – and their associated effects on employment – that we would want 
to exclude from the effects of enterprise zones, and then to re-estimate the models in Table 8 ignoring the 
employment effects of these moves. We have chosen to focus on moves within a given enterprise zone (its 
boundaries as of 2004) and its associated control ring that result in a change in enterprise zone status. For 
this analysis we use the 2,500-foot control ring that was mentioned in the sensitivity analyses above, rather 
than the 1,000-foot control ring, to allow for a somewhat larger, although still small, area over which moves 
can occur. In contrast, however, we ignore moves that result in changes in enterprise zone status that cover 
longer distances – from one enterprise zone to another, or into or out of enterprise zones from non-
enterprise zone regions of the state. The rationale is two-fold. First, what we want to avoid is attributing job 
creation to enterprise zones when the job creation stems from short distance moves that may not even affect 
the labor market in which a business operates. And second, given that we do not really know the motives 
for businesses move, it seems more plausible to assume that very short moves were in response to zone 
incentives, whereas longer moves were not.52 
The results of this analysis are reported in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 reports the number and 
                                                      
52 To be clear, we think it unlikely that a business moves from Los Angeles to San Francisco because of enterprise 
zone incentives, in part because there is a zone in Los Angeles anyway, and in part because long-distance moves are 
almost surely attributable to other factors. However, conditional on making a long-distance move, the business might 
choose to locate in an enterprise zone in the destination city, and it seems like we want to count this type of job 
creation as a benefit of the zone.   
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distribution of the relevant types of relocations, of which there are four: intra-zone moves in which a 
business moves into an area with current enterprise zone designation, from either the control ring or a part 
of the zone not yet designated; and intra-zone moves in the opposite direction. The first thing to notice is 
that the numbers of moves in the two different directions are not very different. For example, there are 
6,879 moves from control rings into designated zone areas, but only about 250 fewer moves in the opposite 
direction. In addition, the numbers of establishment relocations captured in Table 10 are very small, 
together accounting for just over 0.5 percent (i.e., one-half of one percent) of establishment-year 
observations. Of course these are establishment counts, and the implications for employment may differ 
depending on the size of establishments. Thus, Table 11 reports estimates of the same models as in Table 8, 
but excluding from the calculation any employment changes associated with establishments making the 
relocations tabulated in Table 10. The estimates in Table 11 are virtually identical to those in Table 8, 
indicating that relocation of establishments within the geographic areas defined by the enterprise zones and 
their control rings does not drive any of the results.   
5.5. Interpretation 
In one sense it is surprising that enterprise zones have a stronger positive effect on employment when 
the zone is less manufacturing-heavy, since some of the tax incentives that the enterprise zone program 
offers, like the sales tax credit for machinery, should benefit manufacturing firms more than firms in other 
industries. One reason why the enterprise zone program might be less effective in manufacturing areas 
could be that manufacturing firms are often the target of other economic development efforts: the site-
location decisions of automobile plants, for instance, get considerable public attention. A couple of the zone 
managers we surveyed noted that their biggest challenge was that the enterprise zone benefits are small 
relative to the incentives offered by other states and localities. While their comments may not be 
representative of all of California’s enterprise zones, they emphasize that the enterprise zone program is 
only one tool that economic developers use to attract and retain businesses. Even if the enterprise zone 
program offers incentives that should appeal to manufacturing more than to other sectors, the competition 
for manufacturing jobs may be stiffer than for other jobs, and enterprise zone benefits may therefore matter  
30 
 
less for manufacturing firms. Another possibility is that for manufacturing industries, some of the other 
enterprise zone benefits focused on property and machinery are more important; because these subsidize 
capital rather than labor, they could encourage a shift from labor to capital, offsetting the positive 
employment effects that the hiring credit might create.53 
The evidence that activities focused on earning the hiring tax credit reduce the job-creating effects of 
enterprise zones is unexpected. One possible interpretation is that these activities focus more on claiming 
the tax credits retroactively than on creating jobs currently. Tax credits can be claimed retroactively for up 
to four years, and a substantial share of enterprise zone tax credits are claimed retroactively (California 
Budget Project, 2006). It is also clear from perusing the internet that many tax-service companies advertise 
their ability to help businesses in California receive tax reductions for the credits retroactively.54 Critics of 
enterprise zones point to this retroactive activity as evidence that the zone benefits do not help create jobs: 
“By definition, retroactive credits provide bonuses for past actions, but do not encourage businesses to 
increase or maintain employment in future years and thus do not further program goals” (California Budget 
Project, 2006, p. 13). A high level of retroactive claiming with no job creation effects could occur if many 
firms do not know about the hiring credit until after the fact, so that it does not affect their hiring behavior. 
However, another possibility is that firms may know about and respond to the credit, but file retroactively 
only once they earn profits, or once the “load” is large enough to justify the costs of filing that are likely 
partially fixed. The behavior surrounding retroactive hiring credits is difficult to pin down. However, our 
estimates indicating that zones less focused on these credits are more effective at creating jobs provides 
some evidence in favor of the more critical view of how the hiring tax credit gets used (i.e., that some of the 
activities surrounding the hiring credit focus more on retroactive credits than on creating jobs 
contemporaneously).55  
                                                      
53 Greenbaum and Engberg (2004) find no effect on enterprise zones on manufacturing employment overall, using 
data from six states.  
54 See, e.g., ntcgtax.blogspot.com and enterprisetaxcredits.com/enterprise-zone-hiring-credit/ (viewed July 7, 2009).  
55 There is also the possibility of “cross-vouchering,” whereby one zone helps businesses from other zones get 
vouchers for the hiring credit. According to the California Budget Project (2006), enterprise zone administrators 
charge for this, and some zones adopted lenient documentation standards; indeed, new regulations adopted in 2007 
standardized the documentation requirements for vouchering (e.g., California CPA Magazine, 2008; Fine, 2007).   
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Finally, of the local activities we asked zone administrators about in our survey, only marketing and 
outreach efforts increase the job-creating effects of enterprise zones. Marketing and outreach efforts are 
among the activities that zone managers are most likely to say they do (see Table 5), and the current zone 
application process requires localities to lay out a marketing plan. We caution, however, that we are 
measuring zone managers’ own perceptions of local marketing and outreach efforts. It is possible that 
managers view themselves as more active in marketing and outreach after observing positive employment 
effects in their zones, in which case the self-assessment of marketing activity could be the result of 
employment growth rather than a contributor. We also reiterate the earlier caution that we have asked 
current zone managers about their recent marketing efforts, whereas our analysis of employment effects 
looks at the period 1992-2004. Nonetheless, our finding supports 2006 reforms to the enterprise zone 
program that placed more emphasis on local activities and local commitment. 
6. Conclusions  
 
We explore sources of heterogeneity in the effectiveness of enterprise zones. This inquiry is 
motivated by the policy question of whether, despite the overall discouraging conclusions from existing 
estimates of the average effects of enterprise zones, there may be ways to make enterprise zones more 
effective. In particular, we estimate how the effects of enterprise zones vary with factors relating to the 
areas in which enterprise zones are established as well as how enterprise zones are implemented and 
administered. Both of these sources of variation in the effectiveness of enterprise zones are potentially 
exploitable by policymakers and administrators – replicating or encouraging the features of enterprise zone 
programs that are associated with increases in employment, and discouraging zone location decisions and 
policies and activities that lead to ineffective or counter-productive enterprise zones. 
Our empirical analysis is based on data from California’s enterprise zone program, including: 
detailed GIS maps of enterprise zone boundaries; longitudinal data on the universe of business 
establishments with which, in combination with the maps, we can measure employment changes inside and 
outside enterprise zones; data on the characteristics of areas in which enterprise zones are established; and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Again, this cross-vouchering activity might have detracted from other efforts to boost zone employment, especially if 
the cross-vouchering is focused on retroactive credits.  
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information from surveys we conducted of enterprise zone administrators on the activities of their zones. 
Our approach depends on both the detailed data on employment change and results from our survey of local 
zone administrators. The detailed data on employment change, though costly to acquire and time-
consuming to geocode, map, and analyze, are of course essential to the analysis. Our surveys of local 
administrators, though, required only about 100 hours of work; relative to this very modest investment, its 
contribution to our understanding of enterprise zone effectiveness is considerable. 
The evidence points to some potentially significant sources of variation in the effectiveness of 
enterprise zones. In particular, the enterprise zone program appears to have favorable effects on 
employment for zones established in areas that have a relatively low share of manufacturing employment, 
suggesting that enterprise zone incentives do more to favor the creation of jobs outside the manufacturing 
sector than inside that sector. Second, enterprise zones are more likely to boost employment when local 
administrators devote relatively more effort to marketing and outreach activities. On the other hand, 
devoting more effort to helping firms get hiring tax credits reduces any positive employment effects, and 
only zones that focus less on these activities appear to increase employment. This latter result may stem 
from idiosyncrasies of California’s enterprise zone program that may have encouraged efforts to help firms 
get hiring credits that were not in the service of boosting job growth. More generally, given that enterprise 
zone programs differ across states, one should be cautious in extrapolating our results from California to 
draw conclusions about enterprise zone programs in other states, particularly if their programs are quite 
different. 
We have raised some cautions about the strength of this evidence – given that we do not have 
longitudinal evidence on zone activities, and that we are asking a lot of the data in trying to identify and 
estimate the sources of variation in enterprise zone effects. Nonetheless, the evidence does suggest some 
potential avenues by which policymakers might be able to make enterprise zones more effective. More than 
anything else, perhaps, the nature of the evidence we find points to the potential value of shifting research 
on enterprise zones towards a greater emphasis on understanding whether some types of enterprise zones  
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are more effective than others, and what policymakers can do to design programs that might deliver more 
than is suggested by the heretofore discouraging research on enterprise zones.56  
The scope for obtaining additional data on enterprise zone activities may be quite limited, unless such 
data come to be collected as part of the administration of zones. We think that regular surveys of zone 
administrators on their current activities, with a survey instrument consistent across zones and over time, 
would be an inexpensive way to assess how recent and future reforms to the program affect local activities 
and, in turn, affect employment change and other outcomes. Such surveys would be an improvement on 
ours, which necessarily asked administrators about their activities retrospectively. Furthermore, building on 
the ability to exploit GIS mapping that we have illustrated in this paper, there may be considerably more 
scope for more detailed analysis of variation in the types of areas in which enterprise zones are situated – 
including things such as developable land zoned for commercial or industrial use, business and 
transportation infrastructure, and educational and training institutions – and how this variation influences 





                                                      
56 In a related type of analysis, Wernstedt et al. (2006) survey private developers to attempt to understand what types 
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Figure 1B: Santa Ana Enterprise Zone, Initial 1993 Designation (thick black), 1994 Expansion 




Table 1: Current California Enterprise Zones and Year of Designation
a 
Enterprise zones included in 









Altadena/Pasadena   1992  1  Agua Mansa  1986 
Bakersfield 1986  3  Antelope  Valley  1997 
Coachella Valley   1992  2  Calexico  1986 
Delano 1991  1  Fresno  1986 
Eureka 1986  1  Kings  County  1993 
Lindsay   1997  0  Pittsburg  1988 
Long Beach   1992  1  Stockton  1993 
Los Angeles  ...  14 Watsonville  1997 
Los Angeles, Central City  1986  …  Barstow   2005 
Los Angeles, East Side  1988  …  Imperial Valley  2005 
Los Angeles, Harbor Area  1989  …  Stanislaus  2005 
Los Angeles, Mid-Alameda 
  Corridor  1986  …      
Los Angeles, Northeast Valley   1986  …      
Madera 1989  0       
Merced   1991  1      
Oakland  1993  1       
Oroville  1991  1       
Porterville   1985  0       
Richmond  1992  1       
Sacramento, Florin Perkins and  
   Army Depot  1989  2       
Sacramento, Northgate / Norwood   1989  2       
San Diego, Barrio Logan  1987  2       
San Diego, Ysidro/Otay Mesa  1991  3       
San Francisco  1992  4       
San Jose   1986  1       
Santa Ana  1993  1       
Shafter  1995  0       
Shasta Metro  1991  2       
Shasta Valley  1993  0       
West Sacramento  1988  0       
Yuba/Sutter  1986  4       
a The five Los Angeles zones are treated as one large zone for the analysis. In some cases the sources listed below provided 
different start dates. In the cases of such discrepancies, we checked with zone administrators to verify the start date. For 
Coachella, because the zone started in late 1991 (November 10), we use 1992 as the first year.  
Sources: http://www.caez.org/Programs/Map_of_CA_Zones.html (viewed September 19, 2008); street address changes taken 
from street files, found at http://www.hcd.ca.gov/fa/cdbg/ez/enterprise (viewed November 1, 2006); Assembly Jobs, Economic 
Development, and the Economy Committee (2006). 
 
 


















Share of empl. in 
manufacturing 
(1992) 
Share of empl. in 
establishments with  




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Los Angeles  274,434 4,677,221 5.9  1.7  5,062  28.8  40.4  22.3 
San Francisco  215,329 600,488 35.9  1.3  22,813  9.2  44.2  35.0 
Santa Ana  175,018 1,733,164 10.1  1.1  19,919  20.9  39.3  27.8 
Oakland 163,181 775,214 21.0  1.0  5,854  12.9  41.7  28.8 
Long Beach  121,754 4,677,221 2.6  0.7  8,285  11.2  46.9  22.3 
San Jose  98,162 984,246 10.0  0.6  8,787  12.5  46.1  32.6 
Sacramento, Florin Perkins 
and Army Depot  40,832 624,638 6.5  0.2  4,285  15.7  42.4  23.0 
Shasta Metro  40,178 76,069 52.8  0.2  1,059  9.4  51.3  13.7 
Altadena/Pasadena 33,956 4,677,221 0.7  0.2  8,744  10.4  44.8  22.3 
San Diego, Barrio Logan  28,624 1,440,987 2.0  0.2  5,085  22.0  51.3  25.3 
West Sacramento  24,779 85,538 29.0  0.2  1,673  11.1  46.9  30.3 
San Diego, Ysidro/Otay Mesa  24,196 1,440,987 1.7  0.1  1,658  34.8  46.5  25.3 
Yuba/Sutter 21,853 47,581 45.9  0.1  487  16.2  52.0  12.5 
Richmond 20,567 389,983 5.3  0.1  3,561  17.4  47.3  31.6 
Eureka 18,065 50,442 35.8  0.1  4,843  3.2  56.2  20.0 
Sacramento, 
Northgate/Norwood 15,279 624,638 2.4  0.1  7,790  11.2 48.9  23.0 
Coachella Valley  11,050 586,101 1.9  0.1  298  6.0  48.7  14.6 
Madera 9,765 38,635 25.3  0.1  2,176  34.4  47.3  11.7 
Oroville 8,954 81,353 11.0  0.1  1,006  11.3  48.8  19.5 
Bakersfield 8,829 242,303 3.6  0.1  1,516  9.8  50.8  13.3 
Delano 6,212 242,303 2.6  0.0  1,239  2.6  58.7  13.3 
Shasta Valley  5,818 18,777 31.0  0.0  1,395  6.3  62.3  14.2 
Shafter 3,695 242,303 1.5  0.0  786  3.6  73.4  13.3 
Lindsay 2,758 123,101 2.2  0.0  1,331  21.0  55.1  11.8 
Porterville 2,633 123,101 2.1  0.0  2,014  40.6  34.6  11.8 
Merced 641 68,050 0.9  0.0  119  1.9  89.9  12.0 
a Figures are reported for the complete area of each zone as of 2004. In cases where a zone is mainly in one county but also extends into another county, in this table 
the zone is assigned to the county in which most of the zone is located. Note that some numbers repeat in column (2). This occurs when there are multiple zones in 
the same county. For reasons explained in the text, the separate Los Angeles zones listed in Table 1 are treated as one zone.   
 
 















Employment (total)  1,953,220  1,349,629  976,119  373,510  603,591 
Establishments (total)  140,969  96,752  71,006  25,746  44,217 
Employees per square 




14.6 14.7  14.2  16.2  14.3 
Share of employees in 
low-wage industries 
(weighted mean) 
11.6 11.8  11.6  12.4  10.9 
Share of employees in 
manufacturing 
(weighted mean) 
8.0 8.6  7.8 10.8  6.7  
 
 
Table 4: Regression Estimates of Effects of Enterprise Zones
a 




  (1) (2) 
A. Shift in level       
Enterprise zone  -0.017  -0.012 
   (0.047)  (0.035) 
B. Shift in growth rate       
Enterprise zone × linear trend  0.002 -0.007 
   (0.011)  (0.012) 
N  1,300 962 
a Each column and panel reports estimates of the enterprise zone effects from a 
separate regression. These are estimates of specifications (1) and (2) in the text. 
The dependent variables are in logs, substituting ones for zeros in levels prior to 
taking logs. The models all include subzone and year dummy variables, and zone-
year interactions. There are 26 zones, with the total number of initial zone 
designations and expansions adding to 74. Thus, because we have 13 years of data, 
when we do the analysis without control rings we have 962 observations (74 × 13). 
When we include a control ring for each zone, we have 1,300 observations ({74 + 
26} × 13). Standard cluster-robust standard errors (clustering on enterprise zones) 
are in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is 
significant at the 1-, 5- or 10-percent level based on these standard errors. All 













Share of employment in establishments with  
   fewer than 50 employees, 1992  Percentage  50.6  11.2  44.8  52.0 
Share of employment in manufacturing, 1992  Percentage  14.8  10.3  9.2  20.9 
Employment density, 1992  Empl. per square mile 4,684  5,639  1,239  5,854 
Persons 25 + with bachelor's degree or  
   higher, 1990, county  Percentage  20.4  7.5  13.3  25.3 
Year of designation  Year  1990  3  1986  1992 
Marketing   1-5 scale  4.0  0.9  3.0  5.0 
Amending zoning   1-5 scale  1.7  1.1  1.0  2.0 
Training workers   1-5 scale  2.8  1.3  1.0  4.0 
Facilitating earning tax credits   1-5 scale  4.0  1.2  3.0  5.0 
Encouraging the building of additional  
   infrastructure   1-5 scale  2.3  1.5  1.0  3.0 
Offering other tax incentives, credits or  
   discounts   1-5 scale  2.8  1.6  1.0  4.0 
a All rows report unweighted statistics treating each enterprise zone as an observation. The figures in the top panel are based on zone 
boundaries as of 2004. The survey question in the bottom panel are based on a 1-5 scale regarding how active the zone is in doing 
each of the activities, where 1 is not at all active, 2 is not very active, 3 is somewhat active, 4 is very active, and 5 is extremely active. 
All figures reported in the table are for the full set of enterprise zones with the exception of the last item (“Offering other tax 
incentives, …”), for which we did not get a usable response for Los Angeles.  
 



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Enterprise  zone  0.001 0.013 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.047  0.001  0.027 
    (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.036) (0.025) (0.035)  (0.013)  (0.027) 
Enterprise zone interacted with:                         
Share of employment in establishments   -0.509  -0.983        -0.911  -1.093  -0.946  -1.370 
  with <  50 employees, 1992  (0.577)  (1.343)        (0.734)  (1.966)  (0.882)  (2.337) 
Share of employment in manufacturing, 1992   -0.782  -0.712        -1.719  -1.275  -0.972  -0.804 
   (0.327)** (0.722)        (0.820)** (1.126)  (0.310)*** (0.551) 
Employment density, 1992 ('000)  0.001  -0.001        -0.014  -0.008  -0.009  -0.003 
   (0.004)  (0.012)        (0.007)*  (0.013)  (0.003)*** (0.010) 
Percent adults 25 + with bachelor's degree,   -0.065  -0.218        0.656  0.052  0.348  -0.360 
  1990, county  (0.739)  (1.296)        (0.392)  (0.650)  (0.210)  (0.719) 
Zone designation year (# years after 1986)  0.006  0.006        0.038  0.030  0.022  0.022 
   (0.009)  (0.014)        (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.006)*** (0.011)** 
Marketing (from survey: 1-5 scale)        0.064 0.069 0.158 0.148 0.140  0.167 
         (0.042)  (0.053)  (0.065)** (0.086)*  (0.032)*** (0.051)***
Amending zoning (from survey: 1-5 scale)        0.003  0.035  -0.039  -0.026  -0.032  -0.049 
         (0.034)  (0.045)  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.013)**  (0.026)* 
Training workers (from survey: 1-5 scale)         0.016 0.012 0.034 0.032  0.026  0.034 
         (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.045)  (0.019)  (0.029) 
Facilitating earning tax credits         -0.064 -0.025 -0.123 -0.061  -0.121  -0.074 
  (from survey: 1-5 scale)        (0.027)** (0.044)  (0.064)*  (0.092)  (0.063)*  (0.090) 
Encouraging the building of additional infrastructure        -0.011  -0.062  -0.055  -0.046  -0.030  0.002 
 (from survey: 1-5 scale)        (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.056)  (0.020)  (0.047) 
Offering other tax incentives, credits or discounts         -0.014  -0.082  -0.025  -0.058       
  (from survey: 1-5 scale)        (0.029)  (0.047)*  (0.023)  (0.027)**      
N  1,300 962 1,092 767 1,092 767  1,300  962 
a The dependent variable is in logs. These are estimates of specification (3) in the text. Note that the share variables are used in units ranging from zero to one. All of the 
variables interacted with the enterprise zone treatment are de-meaned, so that the main enterprise zone effect reported in the first row of the table is the effect evaluated at 
the sample means of the zone characteristics and survey responses. Standard errors, clustered by zone, are in parentheses. ***,  ** and * indicate significance at the 1-, 5- 
or 10-percent level. All estimates are weighted by 1992 employment levels. In columns (7) and (8) the model is estimated including the Los Angeles zone, dropping the 
one survey variable with an unusable response.   
 
Table 7: Regression Estimates of Effects of Enterprise Zones on Employment, Interacted with Zone Characteristics:  



























(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Enterprise zone × linear trend  0.004  0.001  0.011  0.012  0.011  0.023  0.004  0.010 
   (0.002)*  (0.005)  (0.004)** (0.016)  (0.002)*** (0.018)  (0.002)**  (0.016) 
Enterprise zone × linear trend interacted with:                         
Share of employment in establishments   0.035  -0.069        -0.010  -0.363  0.005  -0.229 
  with <  50 employees, 1992  (0.063)  (0.151)        (0.054)  (0.458)  (0.057)  (0.352) 
Share of employment in manufacturing, 1992   -0.106  -0.106        -0.065  -0.178  -0.101  -0.351 
   (0.050)** (0.121)        (0.054)  (0.343)  (0.060)  (0.301) 
Employment density, 1992 ('000)  0.001  0.000        -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003 
   (0.001)  (0.003)        (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Percent adults 25 + with bachelor's degree,   0.024  -0.142        0.155  -0.194  0.121  -0.058 
  1990, county  (0.093)  (0.305)        (0.114)  (0.321)  (0.092)  (0.376) 
Zone designation year (# years after 1986)  0.0001  0.004        0.001  0.002  0.002  0.005 
   (0.001)  (0.002)*        (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Marketing (from survey: 1-5 scale)       0.007  0.014  0.007  0.024 0.010  0.041 
         (0.006)  (0.023)  (0.007)  (0.031)  (0.005)*  (0.024) 
Amending zoning (from survey: 1-5 scale)        0.001 0.008  0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.016 
         (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.002)  (0.019) 
Training workers (from survey: 1-5 scale)       -0.004  -0.002  -0.001  0.005  0.000 0.006 
         (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.002)  (0.019)  (0.002)  (0.017) 
Facilitating earning tax credits         -0.009 0.002 -0.014 -0.005 -0.013  -0.012 
  (from survey: 1-5 scale)        (0.005)** (0.015)  (0.006)**  (0.021)  (0.007)*  (0.020) 
Encouraging the building of additional infrastructure        -0.005  -0.015  -0.007  -0.017  -0.006  -0.010 
 (from survey: 1-5 scale)        (0.006)  (0.006)** (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.003)*  (0.012) 
Offering other tax incentives, credits or discounts         0.001  -0.018  -0.002  -0.020       
  (from survey: 1-5 scale)        (0.004)  (0.010)*  (0.005)  (0.012)       
N  1,300 962 1,092 767  1,092  767  1,300  962 
a See notes to Table 6. These are estimates of specification (4) in the text.  
 
Table 8: Estimates of Variation in Effects of Enterprise Zones on Employment
a 
Shift in level  Shift in growth rate 



































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Effect of enterprise zone evaluated at 25
th 
and 75
th percentiles of: 
Share of employment in manufacturing, 1992  0.101  -0.100  0.104  -0.046  0.014  0.006  0.031  0.010 
(0.029)*** (0.078) (0.063) (0.086)  (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.029)  (0.021) 
Marketing (from survey: 1-5 scale)  -0.150  0.166 -0.125 0.170 0.003 0.018 -0.004  0.043 
(0.091) (0.045)*** (0.106) (0.079)** (0.008)  (0.006)** (0.030)  (0.040) 
Facilitating earning tax credits  0.202  -0.044 0.135 0.013 0.030 0.003 0.031  0.020 
(from survey: 1-5 scale)  (0.071)*** (0.060)  (0.131)  (0.066)  (0.009)*** (0.004)  (0.033)  (0.023) 
N  1,092 1,092  767  767  1,092 1,092  767  767 
a See notes to Table 6. The table reports estimated effects holding zone characteristics at their sample means, except for the variation in the characteristic indicated in each 
row. The 25
th and 75
th percentiles used are the unweighted percentiles across zones reported in Table 5. The column headings indicate the specification in Tables 6 and 7 to 
which the estimated effects correspond.  
 
Table 9: Estimates of Variation in Effects of Enterprise Zones on Employment, 
Robustness Analyses
a 
Shift in level 
With control rings  Without control rings 
Evaluated at:  25th percentile 75th percentile 25th percentile  75th percentile
Corresponding specification: 
Table 6,  
col. (5) 
Table 6,  
col. (5) 
Table 6,  
col. (6) 
Table 6,  
col. (6) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
With 2,500-foot control ring 
Effect of enterprise zone evaluated at 25
th 
and 75
th percentiles of: 
Share of employment in manufacturing, 1992  0.076  -0.128 
(0.033)** (0.081) 
Marketing (from survey: 1-5 scale)  -0.137  0.111 
(0.091) (0.054)** 
Facilitating earning tax credits  0.225  -0.090 
(from survey: 1-5 scale)  (0.077)***  (0.060) 
With separate year effects for control rings 
and expansion areas 
Effect of enterprise zone evaluated at 25
th 
and 75
th percentiles of: 
Share of employment in manufacturing, 1992  0.074  -0.127  0.068  -0.042 
(0.057) (0.111) (0.082) (0.132) 
Marketing (from survey: 1-5 scale)  -0.174 0.139 -0.125 0.146 
(0.115) (0.066)** (0.130)  (0.107) 
Facilitating earning tax credits  0.188  -0.076  0.095  0.001 
(from survey: 1-5 scale)  (0.099)*  (0.080)  (0.153)  (0.096) 
N  1,092 1,092  767  767 




  Frequency Percent
Intra-zone relocations     
Into designated enterprise zone    
Move from 2,500-foot control ring to subzone designated as enterprise 
zone 6,879 0.25
Move from subzone not designated as enterprise zone to subzone 
designated as enterprise zone  262 0.01
Out of designated enterprise zone 
Move from subzone designated as enterprise zone to 2,500-foot control 
ring 6,624 0.24
Move from subzone designated as enterprise zone to non-designated 
subzone 167 0.01
Intra-zone moves that did not change enterprise zone status  10,378 0.37
Total establishment-year observations  2,780,085 100 
 
Table 11: Estimates of Variation in Effects of Enterprise Zones on Employment, Excluding Movers
a 
Shift in level  Shift in growth rate 



































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Effect of enterprise zone evaluated at 25
th 
and 75
th percentiles of: 
Share of employment in manufacturing, 1992  0.098  -0.097  0.099  -0.046  0.014  0.006  0.032  0.009 
(0.028)*** (0.074) (0.060) (0.085)  (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.029)  (0.022) 
Marketing (from survey: 1-5 scale)  -0.160  0.173 -0.131 0.185 0.002 0.018 -0.009  0.049 
(0.089)* (0.045)*** (0.102)  (0.080)**  (0.009)  (0.007)**  (0.029)  (0.041) 
Facilitating earning tax credits  0.196  -0.043 0.126 0.014 0.030 0.003 0.027  0.022 
(from survey: 1-5 scale)  (0.070)*** (0.058)  (0.125)  (0.068)  (0.009)*** (0.004)  (0.034)  (0.023) 
N  1,092 1,092  767  767  1,092 1,092  767  767 
a See notes to Tables 6 and 8. The sample on which the calculations in this table are based differs from that in Table 8. Contributions to employment change from 
establishments that moved within an enterprise zone or it associated control ring, from an area that was not currently designated as a zone to an area that was so designated, or 
vice versa, are excluded. (Note that the numbers of subzones and years, and hence the sample sized for the regressions, remain the same.) As in Table 8, the table reports 
estimated effects holding zone characteristics at their sample means, except for the variation in the characteristic indicated in each row. The 25
th and 75
th percentiles used are 
the unweighted percentiles across zones reported in Table 5. The column headings indicate the specification in Tables 6 and 7 to which the estimated effects correspond.  
  